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Abstract
This work will analyse the factors which influence decision-making within the Spanish public sector on the financing of
precompetitive research projects developed by firms in collaboration with universities and public research organisms. With
this objective in mind, an econometric model is proposed that explains simultaneously the concession of aid on behalf of the
public sector and the amount of such aid. The estimates carried out indicate, among other results, that the destination of the
budgeted funds explains a large part of the public financing received. However, all the evidence would seem to indicate that
the funding has not been awarded either in order to significantly favour those firms which most need it, nor to give incentive
to high levels of cooperation.
Keywords: Public financing of R&D projects; Cooperation between public research centers and firm; Science and technology policies;
Models with self-selection
1. Introduction
The collaboration in R&D activities between
Ž .firms and public research centres PRCs constitutes
a strategic element towards innovation in the produc-
tive sector and towards the achievement of a better
planning and exploitation of the resources set aside
for research in the public sector. In this sense it is
not surprising that there is a wide range of literature
which analyses the factors and difficulties which
determine the cooperation in R&D between private
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and public sector.1 In parallel, governments of dif-
ferent countries place special interest in the design of
adequate aid which expedites and promotes this type
of collaboration.
In this work an instrument of technological policy
existent in Spain, known as the Concerted Projects
under the National R&D Plan, will be analysed.
1 The study of the ways in which relationships between the two
Žcollectives materialise has been covered in various works Gib-
bons and Johnston, 1974; Link and Rees, 1990; Bailetti and
Callahan, 1992; Senker and Faulkner, 1992; Bonacorsi and Pic-
caluga, 1994; Faulkner and Senker, 1994; Ham and Mowery,
.1998 In others, the barriers which can make the establishment of
relations between the two worlds difficult have been studied
ŽDean, 1981; Azaroff, 1982; Fowler 1984; Hoglund and Persson,´ ¨
.1987; Van Dierdonk et al , 1990; Sheen, 1992; Lee, 1996
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This is a national initiative put into practice in 1988
that pursues two types of objectives: to foment R&D
activities in firm and to encourage cooperation be-
tween the latter and public research centres. The aid
consists of the concession of interest-free loans to
precompetitive research projects developed by busi-
nesses which, in most cases, must include the partici-
pation of a research team from universities andror
public research organisms.
These projects have been the object of various
studies which have covered different aspects of inter-
est.2 However, none has analysed jointly the deci-
sions on the part of the firm and of the administra-
tion involved in the financing of a concerted project
Ž .cooperative project , and the study of the determi-
nants of the amount to be received.
The objective of this work is to identify and to
analyse the factors which determine the financing
approved for each project. The method used consists
of the estimation of an econometric model with
self-selection which explains the amount of the loan
approved according to the characteristics of the firm,
the project and the role of the organism managing
the aid.
The first aspect to be examined in depth will be to
what extent the financing received is related to the
project budget and whether the intensity with which
the projects are funded varies according to the desti-
nation of the allocated budget: acquisition of equip-
ment, remuneration of researchers, etc.; or according
to the place where funds are spent: firm or PRCs.
The work also seeks to establish the degree of
incidence which other characteristics of the project,
Žsuch as its length or the thematic area National
.Programme in which it is registered, have in the
financing received and, above all, whether the at-
tributes of the firm affect the size of the loan signifi-
cantly. Another element which must be included is
whether the public action has tended to favour the
integration into the system of science and technol-
ogy, since this is one of the objectives of the Con-
certed Projects.
This paper is part of a broader research project on
public action in the Concerted Projects in several
2 Fontela et al ,1992; Gonzalez Ayuso et al ,1993; Modrego,´
1995; Molero and Buesa, 1997; Acosta and Modrego, 1997, 1998
fields. One line of research in which work is being
carried out is the study of the effects of public
funding of R&D on performance. According to the
Ž .article of Arora et al. 1998 the aim of this research
is to determine whether or not those firms which
have received aid have obtained better research re-
Žsults than the rest for example, more patents or
more indirect results such as higher sales or an
.increase in staff numbers in the firm and whether
the way in which the aid has been shared out has
allowed these results to be as wide-reaching as possi-
ble.
The paper will be arranged as follows. A view of
Spanish science and technology policy is offered and
the figures which are most relevant to the concerted
projects are presented in Section 2. In Section 3, an
econometric model is formulated to explain the fi-
nancing given to concerted projects. In Section 4 the
variables used are described and, in Section 5, differ-
ent specifications of the model will be presented in
an attempt to answer the questions raised earlier.
Lastly, concluding remarks on the implications for
the design of science and technology policy will be
offered.
2. Spanish science and technology policy: con-
certed projects
The two main lines of action of Spanish science
and technology policy are the National Plan for
Scientific Research and Technological Development
Ž .National R&D Plan and the actions by the Min-
Ž .istry of Industry and Energy MINER . In addition to
Žthese are international actions joint programmes with
.European or Latin American countries, etc. , re-
gional ones from the different autonomous communi-
ties and even some of those established by the
central administration itself, such as for example the
tax shield on R&D activities undertaken by firms.
The National R&D Plan was adopted in 1988
and, since then, sets the priorities for action, pro-
grammes the resources available and integrates ac-
tion in the field of R&D of the productive sectors,
research organisms and universities. The economic
efforts of the National Plan are materialised in the
provision of the National R&D Fund. They are
aimed largely at the fomentation of basic scientific
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research in universities and public research organ-
isms. However, among the National Plan’s objec-
tives is the promotion of communication and
concerted action between universities and public re-
search organisms and firms. To this end, various
mechanisms are put into place under the Plan, such
as the following.
v The network of research results transfer offices
Ž . Ž .OTRI network , is made up of small units OTRI
situated in universities, public research organisms,
and business research associations. Their function is
to promote the transfer of the scientific–technical
offer of universities and public research organisms
towards the productive sectors.
v The OTRI network uses the Programme of
Stimulation of the Transfer of Research Results
Ž .PETRI to incentivate basic and applied research
groups to devote a part of their efforts to R&D
activities the results of which can be transferred to
firms. The PETRI actions serve to support the first
stage of transfer of technology from PRCs to firms.
v The Concerted Projects, the Integrated Projects
and the Cooperative Projects are also oriented to-
wards the improvement of the articulation of the
science and technology system. The first two attempt
to foment collaboration by firms and PRCs in prec-
ompetitive research projects. The difference between
the two instruments originates from the fact that the
Integrated Projects support the undertaking of large-
scale projects which integrate diverse technologies.
On the other hand, the Cooperative Projects fund
collaboration between firms and technological cen-
tres.
While the actions of the National R&D Plan are
oriented towards basic research and the precompeti-
tive development of technology, Spanish technologi-
cal policy can be included under the actions carried
out by the MINER with a view to favouring indus-
trial innovation. The intervention is designed, among
other things, to give incentive to the efforts in tech-
nological development and the incorporation of ad-
vanced technologies in firms and to improve the
competitivity of Spanish industry through an im-
provement in the quality of its products.
Together with the actions managed by the MINER
itself, there is also technological promotion work
carried out directly by the Centre for Technological
Ž .Industrial Development CDTI . The CDTI is depen-
dent on the MINER, and ones of its tasks is the
funding out of its own budget of research and devel-
opment projects carried out by firms. Worth noting
are the Technological Development Projects which
consist of the awarding of loans at privileged interest
rates for projects which are close to the market,
generally coordinated with the bridge programmes
put into place by the MINER.
Furthermore, the CDTI manages programmes
which have been delegated to it by other institutions,
the clearest example being the concerted projects.3
The management by the CDTI of funds of a strongly
business nature is justified not only by an attempt for
there to be coordination between organisms but also
by the CDTI’s capacity to assess the technological
and economic–financial content of the development
projects in which firms participate.
The CDTI is also charged with other tasks such as
the industrial exploitation of the technologies devel-
oped by firms, the promotion of collaboration be-
tween industries and research centres or the manage-
ment of Spanish firms’ participation in international
R&D programmes.
After this overview of Spanish scientific and tech-
nological policy it should be clear that the concerted
projects are the fundamental instrument with which
precompetitive research in firms is supported. Fur-
thermore, their management being the CDTI’s re-
sponsibility, coordination is guaranteed with the
MINER instruments, which can be applied simulta-
neously.
Having situated the concerted projects in the con-
text of Spanish scientific and technological policy as
a whole, it is worth paying some attention to the
evolution of this instrument during the period over
Ž .which public funding is analysed 1988–1991 .
Table 1 shows the annual budgets of the National
R&D Fund and the total amount of the commit-
ments made by the National R&D Plan for con-
certed projects in monetary terms and in relation to
the total amount of public funds. While the National
R&D Fund budget shows a certain amount of stabil-
3 This work on the part of the CDTI is not new, since it already
collaborated in the research projects which requested public aid
through the mechanism of what were known as the Concerted
Plans, predecessors of the Concerted Projects
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Table 1
Investment and funding in the concerted projects in the period 1988–1991
1988 1989 1990 1991
National R&D Fund budget 13,043 19,703 24,224 19,919
Plan’s commitments with concerted projects 4785 5758 6558 5805
Commitments with concerted projectsrNational R&D Fund 36 6% 29 2% 27 0% 29 1%
Number of projects 76 124 129 114
Total investment budget 9465 12,666 15,471 14,016
Investment commitments National Plan 4785 5758 6558 5806
Percentage of investment by National Plan in total budget 51 46 42 41
Public subsidies 1161 1703 2499 2433
Percentage of public subsidies in the total budget 12 2 13 4 16 1 17 3
Monetary figures are expressed in millions of Pesetas
Ž . Ž .Source: Arnes 1990 and Memoria de actividades del Plan Nacional de IqD 1991 National R&D Plan Report 1991 Own elaboration´
ity throughout the period, with figures of around
20,000 million pesetas, in 1991 the amount devoted
to concerted projects is reduced.
Table 1 develops the previous idea further, show-
ing that since 1988 the number of projects approved
increases, as do both the total amount provided by
the National R&D Fund and the total budget of the
projects, reaching a figure of 15,000 million pesetas
in 1990. However, in 1991 all three indicators de-
creased. The average percentage of investment fi-
nanced through interest-free loans was reduced from
the 1988 figure of 51% to 41% in 1991.
However, it is necessary to point out that public
support for concerted projects is not confined to
interest-free loans but also covers public subsidies
from various sources such as the MINER or the
autonomous communities. Table 1 shows that in the
period 1988–1991 the proportion of subsidies in-
creased by more than five percentage points.
3. The model
The financing granted to each concerted project
Ž .F depends on a vector of characteristics of the
Ž .project z , on variables relative to the firm whichF
Ž .carries it out x and on others which reflect theF
behaviour of the organism which manages the aid
Ž . Ž .w . This relation, which is established in Eq. 1 , isF
assumed to be lineal and incorporate a random per-
Ž .turbance u which is normally distributed.F
Fsx b qz g qw u qu 1Ž .F F F F F F F
The estimation of this equation, however, comes
up against the problem that the financing is not
directed to randomly chosen R&D projects, but to
those projects which have been presented and ap-
proved as concerted projects. As a consequence, the
Ž .estimation of Eq. 1 by itself, without taking into
account the effect of this selection process, gives rise
to inconsistent estimations if the financing granted is
not independent of the selection process of the pro-
jects or, to put it another way, if unobserved factors
exist which influence both the probability that a
concerted project may be approved and the quantity
of the loan granted.
The solution to this problem lies in proposing and
estimating models with self-selection, in which, to-
gether with the rule of financing, the mechanism
through which the selection of projects4 is incorpo-
rated, introducing in an explicit way the behaviour of
the firms and the public agency. There are two
decisions to be considered: firstly, firms must decide
whether or not to apply for a loan for a particular
R&D project and, later, the administration decides
which projects are to receive financing and how
much the interest-free loan granted to them will be.
The estimation of a model such as the one de-
scribed raises serious difficulties since it requires
4 For a description of the problematic and methods of estima-
Ž .tion of the models with autoselection, Maddala 1983, 1986 ,
Ž . Ž . Ž .Amemiya 1984 , Dhrymes 1986 and Greene 1991 can be
Ž . Ž .consulted Manski and Wise 1983 and Busom 1991 have also
served as a reference for the formulation of the model
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having available information on the research projects
for which this type of financing was not sought,
whether or not they were finally developed by the
firms. Also, as the administration maintains the
anonymity of the companies which present proposals
that are rejected, the information available does not
allow the differentiation between firms which have
applied for concerted projects and have not been
successful in their application and those which have
not made any such application. The solution which
has been adopted consists of rearranging the deci-
sions of the two agents into a single latent variable
Ž ) .I which includes the propensity of a firm to have
a concerted project and which depends only on the
Ž .attributes of the firm x . In this way the selectionI
mechanism is reduced to an equation of participation
according to which some firms present an applica-
tion for financing and obtain it, whilst others present
no such application, or apply but are rejected.5
In short, the model to be estimated is given by
Ž .Eq. 2 , in which it has been assumed that the
perturbations u and u are distributed jointly as aI F
bivariant normal, with covariance rs If both termsF
Ž .of error were not correlated rs s0 self-selectionF
would not exist and therefore it would be unneces-
sary to estimate the participation and financing equa-
tions jointly.
I )sx b quI I I
)Is1 if I )0 participationŽ .
) 2Ž .Is0 if I F0 non-participationŽ .
Fsx b qz g qw u qu if Is1F F F F F F F
F is not observed if Is0
5 To dispense with the effect of the characteristics of the
projects on the selection process appears to be acceptable if it is
taken into account that the model will be estimated using the four
years which constitute the first phase of the National Plan for
R&D In this way, a firm which has not made use of a concerted
project has had more than one opportunity to present project,
should it have wanted to If a proposal had been rejected on the
grounds of being technically or financially unviable, the firm
would have been able to improve the proposal, or replace it with
another in later applications, adapting it to the minimum require-
ments Consequently, of in the total period the firm has not
developed any concerted project, it is quite possibly due the fact
that the characteristics of the firm or of its research as a whole do
not make it possible or desirable to do so
Ž .Model 2 presents the disadvantage that it does
not specify separately the decisions to request a
concerted project and to award it. Consequently, it
does not make it possible to analyse the application
process and the concession of aid. However, it is
adequate to avoid the self-selectivity problem. In this
way, consistent estimations are obtained of the pa-
rameters of the financing equation.
4. Explanatory variables
To carry out this work a database with 1099
observations was built up, of which 722 correspond
to firms which are developing R&D activities in
Spain at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of
the 1990s, but which have not received aid through a
concerted project between 1988 and 1991, and the
remaining 377 refer to concerted projects carried out
by another 255 firms.6 The funding awarded to the
377 concerted projects which constitute the unit of
Ž .analysis is estimated according to model 2 . The
participation equation uses the characteristics of the
722 firms which are not awarded a concerted project
and the 255 which carry out the 377 projects consid-
ered. The data comes from the CDTI and the Inter-
ministerial Commission for Science and Technology
Ž .CICYT .
Ž .The variables used in the estimation of model 2
are divided into three groups, which, in accordance
with the above exposition, correspond to the vectors
x, z, and w.
4.1. Variables relating to the firm
For the estimation of the model, five variables
Ž .indicators which synthesize the main characteristics
of the firm have been used, as seen in Table 2. These
variables have been obtained in a previous paper
Ž .Acosta and Modrego, 1997 in which the informa-
tion available about the firms has been related to
6 Although 443 concerted projects were approved in the period
1988–1991, the information on some of them was not sufficiently
good and it was therefore decided to dispense with these observa-
tions, which do not seem to have common characteristics
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Table 2
Factors which describe the firms
SIZE Measures the size of the firm
ORRD Reflects the degree to which the firm is orientated towards research activities and technological development
RDCA Summarises the research capability of the firm, especially that which is related to the size of the R&D department
OTHER Other motives for participation in the concerted projects
PROXI Reflects the fact that some firms need more public support to carry out research tasks or, at least, they are more interested in it
their participation in the concerted projects. The
indicators are the coordinates of the firms in the axis
obtained through an analysis of multiple correspon-
dences7 and they adequately summarise the inertia of
the cloud of firms, especially in relation to the
realisation of concerted projects.
The information available included, among other,
sales, staff, personnel dedicated to research, spend-
ing on R&D activities by the firm, intensity with
which the firm dedicates its human resources and
materials to research tasks, autonomous community
in which the firm is situated, age, field of activity
and, of course, information about whether the firm
has been awarded any concerted project between
1988 and 1991.
To summarise the interpretation of the five indica-
Ž .tors, the following may be said: The first one SIZE
is the first factor of the multiple correspondence
analysis, and reflects the size of the firm, since
44.5% of its inertia comes from the sales and staff
variables. The situation of other variables — such as
R&D personnel or R&D spending, which are also
influenced by the size of the firm, reinforce this
interpretation.
The analysis of the second factor shows that it
counterpoises firms whose dedication to research
tasks is small with firms oriented towards these
Žactivities, both in absolute terms R&D spending
. Žand R&D personnel and in relative terms R&D
7 Most of the variables contained in the original databases are
continuous However, they have been grouped into intervals,
obtaining discrete variables, since this transformation makes the
information easier to understand and allows the inclusion of
variable qualitative analyses
spending in relation to sales and R&D personnel in
.relation to the total number of staff . For this reason,
Ž .this factor ORRD can be related to the vocation to
carry out R&D activities.
Ž .The third indicator RDCA synthesises the firm’s
research capacity in terms of the size of its R&D
department. It explains above all that firms with
small R&D departments do not tend to carry out
concerted projects. Thus, if the second factor indi-
cates that firms which put a great emphasis on R&D
activities are more likely to undertake concerted
projects, the third indicator shows that there are
small firms which, although they devote a significant
part of their resources to R&D, do not reach the
minimum scale necessary to undertake concerted
projects.
Factors four and five cover peculiarities which are
not included in the three previous indicators. Despite
the fact that the synthesised inertia for these factors
is low, they are used in the estimation of the model
since they help discriminate those firms with a con-
Ž .certed project. The fifth PROXI has been inter-
Ž .preted as interest or need for public aid. It shows
that small firms with small R&D departments tend
to carry out more CDTI-managed projects than would
seem to be in accordance with the first three factors,
while those which have more resources have less of
a tendency to establish relations with the CDTI.
Finally, it has not been possible to find a clear
Ž .significance for the fourth factor OTHER , how-
ever, firms with concerted projects tend to have
positive coordinates. For this reason, it has been
attributed to mean other motives for participation in
the Concerted Projects.
As well as the factors, a dummy variable is
introduced for each of the seven sectors of activity
that appear in Table 3, in which the firms have been
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Table 3
Sectors of activity
C1 Agriculture, stockbreeding and fishing
C2 Energy and water
C3 Extraction and transformation of non-energetic minerals
Chemical industry
C4 Other manufacturing industries
C5 Construction
C6 Rest of sectors
C7 Financial institutions, insurance and services
classified according to the first digit of the National
Ž . 8Classification of Economic Activities CNAE .
4.2. Variables relating to the project
ŽThe variables which describe each project Table
.4 refer both to its total budget and to the destination
of the latter, and also take into account the length of
Ž .the project measured in months variable DU . The
budget is broken down into acquisition of equipment,
materials and other expenses both by the firm and by
the PRCs which might participate in the project. It
also included spending on staff.
Since one of the objectives of the concerted pro-
jects is to encourage collaboration between firm and
PRCs, it is interesting to find out whether the public
financing has been directed specially towards those
projects with greatest collaboration with PRCs. In
order to include this effect in the model, the results
of a work in which the characteristics of the con-
certed projects for the period 1988–1991 are anal-
Ž .ysed Acosta and Modrego, 1998 have been taken
into account. In this document it is shown that the
participation of the firm in the project depends more
on the degree to which it is involved in R&D tasks
than the relation between the size of its R&D de-
8 It is worthy of note that the immense majority of firms of
Ž .branch 8 of the CNAE variable C7 provide services to other firm
Ž . Ž .CNAE code 84 Within the metal transformation industry C3
Ž .those belonging to the chemical industry 25 stand out as do, in a
lesser way, those belonging to the non-metallic mineral product
Ž . Ž .industry 24 As detected by Gonzalez Ayuso et al 1993 , in the´
Ž .category of the rest of sectors C6 there is a significant number of
Ž .firms in the wholesale trade sector 61 , which really include
subsidiaries of large companies from the information technology
or automobile sectors
partment and the size of the project. That is to say,
the evidence seems to indicate that the collaboration
with PRCs is more orientated towards completing a
research task of the firm than towards relieving the
R&D department of workload. This result is in
accordance with the works which have detected that
the possibilities which a firm has to benefit from
outside contributions depend on its own research
Žcapability Mowery, 1983; Arora and Gambardella,
1991; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; Cohen and
.Levinthal, 1989, 1994; Veugelers, 1997 .
The consequence of this conclusion is that in
order to explain the participation of public re-
searchers in concerted projects, it is necessary to
analyse in detail the capabilities of the firms and the
PRCs, as well as the attitudes of both agents to the
joint realisation of R&D activities. Although there
are no sufficient variables to analyse in detail the
causes of collaboration, an indicator — COLAB
Ž .variable — obtained by Acosta and Modrego 1998
is available and reflects the degree to which the
PRCs involve themselves in a concerted project9 or,
alternatively, the sharing out of research tasks be-
tween the firm and the universities and PRCs. In any
case, this indicator not only measures the importance
of the PRCs’ collaboration, but also reflects the
existence of a relation between the degree to which
Žthe firm is truly dedicated to R&D tasks measured
by the percentage of spending on R&D over sales
.and the proportion of staff devoted to R&D and the
intervention of the researchers from the public sector
in the project.
4.3. Variables relating to the public performance
Dummy variables referring to the year in which
the concerted project was approved have been intro-
duced; thus the variables CON1, CON2, and CON3
refer, respectively, to the differential effect in rela-
tion to 1991 of the 1988, 1989 or 1990 invitations
for applications. Together with these, other aid
9 It is related in a significant way with the distribution of the
project budget and the spending on personnel between the firm
and the PRC It also includes the number of researchers supplied
by the firm and the PRC for the project
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Table 4
Components of the project budgeta
BUDGET Total project budget
BILAB Investment in laboratory equipment for the firm
BIFA Investment in other fixed assets for the firm
BLABO Spending on labour in the firm
BMATE Spending on materials carried out by the firm
BOTHER Other spending carried out by the firm
BNOTI Budget dedicated by the firm other than to the investment: BLABOqBMATEqBOTHER
Ž .CEQUI Investment in equipment for the public research centres PRCs
CLABO Spending on labour by PRCs
CMATE Spending on materials carried out by PRCs
COTHER Other spending carried out by PRCs
CNOTI Budget carried out by PRCs other than to the investment in equipment: CLABOqCMATEqCOTHER
CTOTAL Cost of collaboration of PRC: CEQUIqCNOTI
NOINV Budget dedicated other than to investment: BNOTIqCNOTI
aAll variables are measured in millions of Pesetas
granted by the public sector to the same project has
been considered, OTRPUB being the sum of all
these.
Finally, a dummy variable has been included for
each of the 15 thematic areas or National Pro-
grammes in which the project can be inserted10, as
shown in Table 5. These variables not only reflect
the variability in the public performance according to
the technological objectives of the concerted pro-
jects, but also characterise the projects, since they
reflect the differences between technologies.
5. Results of the estimation
Ž .The estimation of the parameters of model 2 has
been obtained by jointly applying the method of
maximum likelihood. Tables 5 and 6 show the re-
sults of the estimation of the model for the three
specifications, which have the same independent
variables in the participation equation, but which are
differentiated by the variables included in the financ-
ing equation.
10 The prioritisation of the research funded by the National Plan
has been specified in National Programmes up to 1999 From
2000 onwards it will be based on technological areas and sectors
of activity
5.1. Participation equation
Table 6 shows the results of the estimation of the
model including as regressors the variables relating
to the firm and the dummy variables which indicate
that each of the firms belongs to a specific sector of
Ž .activity variables C1 to C7 . All of these variables
are significant both individually and as a whole and
the predictive capacity of the participation equation
is high, since around 78% of the observations are
adequately classified by the model.
Ž .The indicator of the size of the firm SIZE is not
significant and has therefore been eliminated from
Table 5
National Programmes
ROB Advanced automatization and robotics
BIO Biotechnology
AGR Agricultural research
FAR Pharmaceutical research and development
GAN Stockbreeding research and development
ESP Space research
MIC Microelectronics
MAT New materials
NAT Conservation of natural patrimony and processes of
environmental degradation
GEO Geological resources
MAR Marine resources and aquiculture
SAL Health
POR Forest systems and resources
ALI R&D in food technology
TIC Information technology and communications
8
Table 6
Participation equation
Variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
a a aParameter t-Student Parameter t-Student Parameter t-Student
ORRD 1 3034 11 41 1 2997 11 53 1 2972 11 57
RDCA 1 1127 7 59 1 1138 7 74 1 1112 7 75
OTHER 0 8406 6 41 0 8438 6 45 0 8441 6 47
PROXI 1 4528 8 70 1 4464 8 76 1 4492 8 84
C1 y0 9956 y3 28 y0 9947 y3 30 y0 9944 y3 30
C2 y0 7963 y3 43 y0 7741 y3 43 y0 7658 y3 41
C3 y0 7150 y6 92 y0 7078 y7 00 y0 7092 y7 01
C4 y0 9232 y11 63 y0 9329 y11 86 y0 9306 y11 85
C5 y0 4221 y3 20 y0 4208 y3 26 y0 4274 y3 31
C6 y1 1272 y5 99 y1 1236 y5 97 y1 1246 y5 99
C7 y0 9341 y5 44 y0 9175 y5 60 y0 9142 y5 63
a Ž .The statistics t of Student are robust to the presence of heterocedasticity White, 1980
the definitive specifications. This is an important
result in that it allows the affirmation that the size of
the firm has not had incidence in the participation in
the concerted project programme, although indirectly
other characteristics which could in part be related to
the size, such as research capability, have had inci-
dence.
The parameters which accompany the variables
ORRD, RDCA and OTHER indicate that the firms
which are most intensely involved in R&D activities
and with most capacity to carry them out are the
ones most prone to making use of a concerted pro-
ject. Also, the need or interest for public support,
measured by the variable PROXI, affect the probabil
ity of embarking upon this type of research project.
In any case, it should not be forgotten that this
equation serves to correct the selection bias, which
could affect the parameters of the financing equation,
and not to analyse in detail the reasons behind firms’
participation.
5.2. Financing equation
The financing awarded has been made to depend
upon the breakdown of costs of the project, its
duration and the financing provided by other organ-
isms of the central or autonomous administration. It
is also considered relevant the introduction of dummy
variables reflecting the effect on financing of each of
the four call of proposals for concerted projects,
Ž .although in practice the first one 1988 is the only
significant one because the financing granted was
exceptionally high.
Moreover, after proposing multiple alternatives
and carrying out contrasts of hypotheses, it was
decided to include the variable which measures the
Ž .PRC collaboration COLAB , the variables which
characterise the firms and the dummy variables of
the National Programme, leaving out those from the
activity sector.11 In the various estimated specifica-
tions, the indicator which reflects the size of the firm
Ž .SIZE does not have a significant effect on the
financing, and was therefore eliminated leaving as
regressors only the other four factors.
In specification 1 of Table 7, it can be observed
that the contribution of the National Plan, compared
with other sources of spending, is smaller when the
funds of the project are destined for the acquisition
of fixed assets for the firm, especially if they are not
strictly related to the research activity. That is to say,
the tendency is, logically, to finance the costs which
are most directly related to the project, especially if
they are specific to the latter and do not extend to
other research being carried out by the firm. The
above result contrasts with the fact that the equip-
ment costs destined to PRCs are completely financed
Žit is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the
11 In fact, it is more reasonable to introduce the variables of the
National Plan because they are an attribute of the project which is
being financed, while the sector of activity characterises the firm
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Table 7
Financing equation
Variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
a a aParameter t-Student Parameter t-Student Parameter t-Student
BILAB 0 3996 41 48 0 3987 49 61 0 3998 50 14
BIFA 0 3022 10 56 0 3001 10 93 0 3006 11 20
CEQUI 1 0617 10 03 1 0662 9 43 1 0818 10 15
BLABO 0 4708 24 24
BMATE 0 4425 12 82
BOTHER 0 4668 25 46
BNOTI 0 4630 40 59
CLABO 0 4510 11 25
CMATE 0 6093 7 47
COTHER 0 4856 7 67
CNOTI 0 4824 16 67
NOINV 0 4658 42 56
DU 0 157 3 01 0 159 3 23 0 160 3 25
CON1 8 690 5 89 8 594 5 87 8 559 5 83
OTRPUB y0 3386 y13 13 y0 3344 y13 90 y0 3331 y13 98
ORRD y9 747 y5 56 y9 823 y5 94 y9 861 y5 95
RDCA y8 111 y3 95 y8 443 y4 53 y8 384 y4 52
OTHER y7 721 y3 93 y7 637 y3 90 y7 746 y4 16
PROXI y11 071 y4 64 y11 187 y4 70 y11 312 y5 00
COLAB y2 036 y1 79 y2 119 y1 94 y1 825 y2 29
ROB 1 682 0 75 1 026 0 50 1 236 0 61
BIO y6 025 y1 94 y5 591 y1 71 y5 599 y1 76
AGR y4 411 y1 09 y4 814 y1 18 y4 646 y1 14
FAR y7 876 y3 16 y6 708 y3 21 y6 580 y3 16
GAN y3 595 y0 62 y2 981 y0 46 y2 691 y0 43
ESP 3 570 1 57 3 814 1 80 3 964 1 86
MIC 7 511 2 31 7 362 2 27 7 372 2 26
NAT y1 072 y0 26 y1 133 y0 27 y1 179 y0 28
GEO y7 731 y0 13 y8 051 y0 24 y7 966 y0 25
MAR 0 507 0 06 0 609 0 07 0 761 0 08
SAL y3 001 y0 53 y2 717 y0 47 y2 455 y0 42
FOR y5 020 y1 08 y5 249 y1 10 y5 074 y1 08
ALI y1 670 y0 74 y1 775 y0 79 y1 701 y0 75
TIC 6 959 3 19 6 744 3 34 6 856 3 39
Constant 12 914 6 11 12 934 6 37 12 904 6 47
b b brs y9 755 22 98 y9 704 24 2 y9 729 24 6F
a Ž .The statistics are robust to the presence of heterocedasticity White, 1980
b The nullity contrast of rs uses a statistic x 2 with one degree of freedomF
.corresponding parameter is equal to one . This be-
haviour is apparently reasonable to the extent that
the acquisition of equipment for the PRCs allows
them to increase their infrastructure, which will in
turn improve their future capacity to carry out re-
search in collaboration with other firms.
In synthesis, the public agency finances approxi-
mately 100% of the acquisition of equipment for the
PRCs. However, it is somewhat stricter when it
comes to contributing funds destined towards the
acquisition of fixed assets for the firm, especially if
they are not directly related to research activities.
The financed part of the rest of the costs is midway
between the two.
In Table 7 it can be seen that the coefficients
which accompany the variables that reflect the costs
of those projects not destined to investment in the
Ž .firm BLABO, BMATE, BOTHER and the PRC
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Ž .CLABO, CMATE, COTHER are quite similar. In
the second specification of Table 7, it has been
imposed that the parameters referring to these costs
Žcarried out in firm and PRC should be equal four
.restrictions and, consequently, these variables have
been replaced by BNOTI and CNOTI. The results
are qualitatively equal to those commented on in the
first specification, and it is impossible to reject the
hypothesis that firms and PRCs receive the same
financing for the spending other than on investment,
independently of whether they are to be destined to
cover labour, materials or other expenses.
Again, the similarity between the coefficients of
Žthe variable costs of the firm and of the PRC BNOTI
.and CNOTI has led to the contemplation of the
hypothesis that these costs are financed in the same
way independently of whether they are carried out
by the firm or by the PRCs. In the third specification
of Table 7, BNOTI and CNOTI have been joined to
make a single variable which comprehends all the
Ž .project costs not destined to investment NOINV .
This restriction is statistically acceptable, obtaining
results that do not alter significantly any of the other
coefficients.
The rest of the variables has a similar incidence to
any of the three specifications of the following model.
v The contribution tends to grow with the fore-
seen length of the project at a rhythm of 160,000
Pesetas12 for each month.
v The effect of the variable COLAB is negative,
indicating that the projects where there are the high-
est degrees of collaboration tend to receive less
financing.13 This result appears to contradict the
objective of integration into the system of science
and technology characteristic of the concerted pro-
jects, since it implies a worse treatment for those
projects that enjoy highest levels of PRC collabora-
tion. An alternative explanation, which indicates a
12 During the period 1988–1991 the average exchange rate was
110 PesetasrDolar
13 The factor which is not taken into account is whether carrying
out the research in PRCs is cheaper than doing so in the firms,
that is, whether the action in itself of collaborating with re-
searchers from the public sector implies a grant for the firm Of
this is so, the requirement that PRCs participate in the project
could be serving to make firm see the advantages in establishing
links with universities or public research organisms
more favourable behaviour towards the projects de-
veloped with closest collaboration, consists of as-
suming that access to concerted projects has been
made easier for those firms which, having lesser
qualities for the development of precompetitive re-
search, have presented proposals in which they assert
their claim to collaboration from a PRC. In this way,
the lesser financing of these projects would suggest
that the approval of a proposal has been balanced
with a slightly lower financing of the project.
In support of this second interpretation is the fact
that the variable COLAB is negatively correlated to
the residuals of the participation equation; that is to
say, the lower the estimation of I ) , the higher the
degree of collaboration from PRCs the approved
projects tend to have. At any rate, this is a tentative
result since the degree of collaboration from PRCs in
the proposals which were rejected is unknown and,
therefore, it is not possible to determine whether or
not it has been a relevant factor for the approval of
projects in firm with lesser qualities for the develop-
ment of precompetitive research.
v The parameter which accompanies the other
Ž .public financing variable OTRPUB indicates that
the funds contributed by the National Plan are re-
duced when another public institution co-finances
the project. However, the substitution is only partial,
since for every additional Peseta of financing coming
from the public sector, the National Plan only re-
duces its contribution by 0.33 Pesetas. In this way,
even after taking into account the rest of the privi-
leged loans and grants which the public sector awards
to the firm, the parameter being considerably less
than the unit, the firms are motivated to seek this
co-financing.
v The public performance presents significant dif-
ferences between 1988 and the rest of the period in
question. The year 1988 was special in the financing
of the concerted projects since, on average, the pro-
jects received an additional 7.2 million Pesetas. This
fact can be explained since, being the first year of
the concerted projects operation, relatively few were
approved, thus allowing a more favourable treatment
to be offered to them.
v Regarding the National Programmes, the tech-
nologies which on average receive most financing in
relation to the New Materials programme, whose
dummy variable has been excluded, are those of the
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National Programmes for Information Technology
and Telecommunications, Microelectronics and
Space Research. On the contrary, the projects inte-
grated in Biotechnology, Agricultural research, Phar-
maceutical research and development and Forest sys-
tems and resources tend to receive lower levels of
funding. The rest of the programmes tend to receive
a similar treatment to that of New Materials.
v The characteristics of the firm summarised by
the five factors are significant except for SIZE,
which measures the size of the firm. This means that
the attributes of the firms which explain why they
have or have not developed a concerted project
Ž .ORRD, RDCA, OTHER, PROXI are taken into
consideration when determining the financing
awarded. The fact that the signs of all of these
variables are contrary to those of the selection equa-
tion seems to indicate that the characteristics of the
firms which explain why a firm has a concerted
project have a negative influence in the amount
received. In other words, the most R&D activity-
orientated firm, those with most capacity to carry
them out, as well as those which are most interested
in the concerted projects, are more likely to obtain
this funding, but the amount of the loan tends to be
lower.
v Following the results from the estimation, the
Žcontrast of the selectivity bias carried out Dhrymes,
.1986, pp. 1625–1626 , always rejects the hypothesis
that rs is zero, indicating that it is necessary toF
consider the model with self-selection. In this way,
the joint estimation of both equations is necessary to
obtain consistent estimations of the importance of
the characteristics of the chosen projects to deter-
mine the amount of the financing to be provided.
The negative sign of rs suggests the presenceF
of unmeasured characteristics which act in an inverse
way on the equations of participation and financing,
which implies that among firms and projects with
identical measured attributes, those firms with greater
possibilities of having a project tend to receive
smaller amounts of aid.
Ž .The results of the estimation of model 2 show
Žthat the observed characteristics of the firm ORRD,
.RDCA, OTHER and PROXI as well as the unob-
served factors which positively affect participation in
concerted projects imply that the firms with greater
possibilities of applying for and obtaining a project
are those which receive smaller loans. Although the
model does not allow us to differentiate whether they
are the most prone to applying for them or those for
which the granting of a project is easiest, in both
cases the public performance seems adequate. Thus,
to the extent that these variables or the unobservable
factors reflect the ease with which a firm has its
proposal approved, the fact that the financing is
lower may be reasonable if it is due to the fact that
the public agency reduces aid to those firm with
sufficient research capacity and which do not need
loans in order to carry out more R&D. On the other
hand, to the extent that these variables synthesise the
propensity of firms to present their applications for
concerted projects, the lower financing is justified
since it is no longer necessary to offer incentives in
order that they participate.
At any rate, there is still a further possibility to
explain the effect of unobserved characteristics,
which is analogous to that provided by the negative
sign of the COLAB variable. It may be that the
public agency accedes to financing firms which pre-
sent projects whose approval is not clearly justified
according to their observed characteristics, but that
in return it awards them a slightly lower level of
financing than that which would correspond to them
in accordance with the budget of the project and the
rest of characteristics.
It is not possible to assure which of the above
explanations is the most fitting. They may well all be
valid for some groups of projects. In any case, they
all respond to reasonable behaviour on the part of the
public agency.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that, in the three
specifications described, the hypothesis of joint nul-
lity of all parameters is clearly rejected and, if the fit
goodness of the model is measured by the value R2
of the financing equation14, it is over 0.85. More-
over, since the estimations obtained by maximum
likelihood are very sensitive to the deviations of
error distribution with respect to the normal; the
normality contrast proposed by Pagan and Vella
14 The R2 has been calculated through the residuals of the
financing equation of the model estimated by maximum likeli-
hood
12
Ž . 151989 for models with self-selection has been
applied. In none of the three specifications the nor-
mality hypothesis is rejected, since the value of the
Ž 2statistic which follows a distribution x with three
.degrees of freedom is 2.38, 2.3, and 2.2, respec-
tively.
5.3. Determinants of financing of the national R&D
plan
To have an idea of the incidence of each variable
in the amount of the loan granted, the estimated
financing of the representative project has been cal-
culated, whose variables take the average value of
the approved projects. Taking into account the exis-
tence of selectivity bias, to estimate the financing
Ž .awarded to the said project, expression 3 must be
used, in which the parameters used are those esti-
Žmated in the second specification of Table 7 de-
.noted by a circumflex . The last summing of this
expression reflects the effect of the selectivity bias
on the financing awarded to a project presented by a
Ž .firm with x characteristics, the expression l x bI I I
being the inverse Mill’s ratio.
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆFrIs1 sx b qz g qw u qrs l x bˆ ˆ ˆŽ . Ž .F F F F F F F I I
3Ž .
The project with average characteristics has a
probability of being converted into a concerted pro-
ject of 0.60 and its estimated financing is of 53.3
million Pesetas, as contrasted with the real 53.1
million. Since the representative project has a budget
of 120.5 million Pesetas, the National Plan finances
44.2% of the total budget, whereas the model pre-
dicts 44%.
Table 8 reflects the effect which each one of the
variables has on the determination of the amount of
the loan awarded to the average project. Considering
only the breakdown of the project budget, an approx-
imation is obtained which is slightly higher than the
Ž .financing awarded 54.6 million Pesetas , with the
rest of variables supposing an effect of only y1.3
million Pesetas.
15 A brief description of this test can be found in Maddala
Ž .1993, p 204
Table 8
Contribution of the variables to the financing of the National Plan
Ž .Project with average characteristics
aVariable Total effect
BILAB 11 867
BIFA 1 042
BNOTI 32 045
CEQUI 1 669
CNOTI 7 976
DU 4 496
CON1 1 299
OTRPUB y5 681
ORRD y3 918
RDCA y1 703
OTHER y1 430
PROXI y1 333
COLAB 0 000
Type of project and constant 13 232
Selectivity bias y6 235
a In millions of Pesetas During the period 1988–1991 the
average exchange rate was 110 PesetasrDolar
This, however, must not be interpreted as mean-
ing that the rest of variables do not have incidence in
the financing received. What happens is that they
compensate each other. Thus, the constant plus the
effect of the dummy variables which include the
belonging of the projects to the different National
Programmes amounts to 13.2 million and if it is
added that the average project receives 4.5 million
Ž .because of its duration 28 months and that the
greater financing of the year 1988 contributes 2.3
million, 19 million is added to the loan. However,
the other variables reduce the financing by 14 mil-
lion and the selectivity bias by 6.3 million. Going a
Žlittle further into detail, the limited impact almost
.zero in the average project of the COLAB variable
becomes clear. On the other hand, the variables of
the firm as a whole imply a reduction of 8.3 million.
The results which are obtained for the project
with average characteristics are not a special case,
since they are demonstrated quite generally, even if
the effect of some of the variables, such as COLAB,
may in some cases be more important. In the same
way, the selectivity bias grows when we consider
projects whose approval is not easily explained based
on the characteristics observed in the firm which
develops it.
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Table 9
Public action according to the firm’s staff
Ž .Staff no of people Up to 24 25 up to 99 100 to 249 250 to 999 1000 or more
Number of projects 56 85 78 78 80
aBudget 60 9 102 0 145 8 148 0 130 3
aNational Plan funding 29 0 45 6 64 6 63 2 56 4
Percentage of funding 47 6 44 8 44 3 42 7 43 3
aPreference 1 68 0 49 2 32 y2 01 y2 01
PreferencerFinancing from Plan 5 8% 1 1% 3 6% y3 2% y3 6%
Probability of having project 0 57 0 48 0 46 0 67 0 78
a Monetary figures are expressed in millions of pesetas and correspond to the average of each group
5.4. Financing of the national R&D plan and firm’s
characteristics
An aspect worth studying is the influence of the
firm’s characteristics on the treatment of the projects
by the public agency. The use of the indicators
Ž .SIZE, ORRD, RDCA, OTHER, PROXI may not be
altogether clear. It therefore seems appropriate to end
this work by discussing the importance of the size of
Žthe firm which carries out the project through its
. Žstaff and of its research capacity personnel devoted
.to R&D activities in the obtaining of concerted
projects and the treatment of the projects undertaken
by them.
In Tables 9 and 10 information is provided on the
concerted projects, classifying them respectively ac-
cording to staff numbers and the number of person-
nel devoted to R&D activities in the firm carrying
out the project. The variables considered make refer-
ence to the representative project for each group, that
is the project with average characteristics. These are
the average budget for the projects, average financ-
ing awarded by the National Plan and the percentage
of the budget which is funded. The above variable is
not appropriate to discuss the degree to which the
public agency has prioritised the projects according
to the firms’ characteristics. The reason for this is
that, since public financing largely depends on the
characteristics of the project, the variability in the
percentage financed may be justified by the differ-
ences between projects more than by the difference
in treatment towards firms. In that sense, the vari-
ables of preference and preference in relation to
financing awarded by the National Plan provide in-
formation on the way in which prioritisation has
taken place according to the firm’s characteristics.
Finally, the probability that the representative firms
of each group will participate in concerted projects is
indicated.
The preference variable makes use of the esti-
mated model to obtain a clearer vision of the influ-
ence of the firms’ characteristics on the treatment of
the project by the public agency. To this end, the
financing which would correspond to each group’s
Table 10
Public action according to the firm’s R&D personnel
Ž .R&D personnel no of people Up to 4 5 to 9 10 to 24 25 to 49 More than 49
Number of projects 88 50 83 68 88
aBudget 66 0 91 91 124 4 136 1 175 6
aNational Plan funding 29 8 42 3 56 2 59 7 74 4
Percentage of funding 45 13 46 08 45 15 43 82 42 36
aPreference 1 28 0 99 0 15 0 57 y2 43
PreferencerFinancing from Plan 4 3% 2 3% 0 3% 1 0% y3 3%
Probability of having project 0 49 0 20 0 62 0 70 0 82
a Monetary figures are expressed in millions of pesetas and correspond to the average of each group
14
representative project has been foreseen according to
Ž Ž ..all of its characteristics according to expression 3 ,
but without considering the indicators relating to the
Žfirm carrying out the project ORRD, RDCA,
. ŽOTHER y PROXY , the unobservable factors selec-
.tivity bias nor the degree of cooperation with PRC
Ž . 16COLAB . The difference between the funding
awarded by the public agency to the representative
project and the amount estimated by this procedure
is a measure of the effect of the characteristics of the
representative firm on the amount of the loan. The
preference variable measures the divergence of the
above measurement between the representative pro-
ject and the average project out of the 377 analysed.
In this way, the preference variable covers the addi-
tional funding which each group’s representative
project receives as a result of the effect of the firm
which carries it out.
The number of projects awarded is distributed in a
fairly uniform way between all the categories of firm
size and R&D department, although, as one would
expect, the budget of the concerted projects tends to
increase according to the size and research capacity
Žof the firm. Anyway, it is the larger firms 250 or
.more employees which present greater probabilities
of receiving the award of a concerted project, fol-
lowed by those with fewer than 25 employees. Table
10 shows that the size of the R&D department is
associated with a greater likelihood of undertaking
concerted projects, but it is striking that firms with
between five and nine employees in their R&D
department tend to participate less than those with
fewer than five.
In accordance with the preference and prefer-
encerfunding variables, it can be said that the differ-
ences in funding awarded attributable to the peculiar-
ities of firms are small. The most favoured projects
have been those carried out by firms with fewer than
25 workers with almost 6% of additional funding
over what should have corresponded to them accord-
ing to the characteristics of the project. On the other
Ž .hand, the larger firms 250 or more employees have
seen a reduction in their funding of a little over 3%.
16 The effect of the COLAB variable has been considered
because it may be related with characteristics of the firm which
explain the degree to which PRC collaboration is necessary
On the question of R&D personnel, those firms
Žwith large R&D departments which have developed
.the largest-scale projects have received less than
average funding. The rest of the projects are above
the average, especially those carried out by firms
with fewer than five people devoted to R&D activi-
ties.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this work is to analyse the action of
the administration when funding precompetitive pro-
jects carried out by firms with the cooperation of
PRCs. One of the results obtained is that the project
budget and the destination of this budget are the
most important factors to explain the financing
awarded to a project. The maximum financing is
provided when equipment is acquired for the partici-
pant PRCs, which is reasonable if it is taken into
account that they could be re-used later by the PRCs
for their own research. On the other hand, it is much
less when it comes to incorporating fixed assets for
the firm. The rest of the expenses which the projects
generate are treated in an intermediate way.
In fact, the results obtained seem to indicate that
the public performance has consisted of applying
quite general criteria to all the projects which were
acepted, without significantly favouring those that, in
principle, because of their characteristics, were closer
to the objectives of fomenting R&D activities and
encouraging cooperation between PRCs and firms.
Even so, it seems to be detected that public action
tends to finance a little more generously those firms
with less tendency to participate in concerted pro-
jects. This behaviour means that the larger firms,
with large R&D departments, receive less funding
than the rest. On the other hand, very small firms, in
which a considerable proportion of their staff are
devoted to R&D activities, are most favoured.
The question which immediately arises is whether
or not the public agency has adequately chosen
which groups to favour. To answer this question in
any conclusive way, it would be necessary to study
whether or not more support has been given to those
firms which require more public incentives to collab-
orate with PRCs or to carry out precompetitive re-
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search projects. This task lies outside the limits set
by the aims of this work and, indeed, it is not
possible to carry out using the administrative infor-
mation available. Even so, the way in which the
public agency has acted may be justified by the
following arguments. To favour small firms would
seem appropriate inasmuch as for the smaller firms,
the concerted project may serve as a first contact
with the PRCs which might prove fruitful later in the
establishment of lasting links, both formal and infor-
mal, and it must not be forgotten that the small firms
are the ones which most benefit from this type of
Ž .relations Link and Rees, 1990 . Moreover, smaller
firms are those which face greater difficulties in
finding external funding, which makes it highly likely
that the loans awarded serve to make it possible to
initiate other research projects. On the other hand,
larger firms have much easier access to external
funding, and therefore possibly do not have too
many economic problems when it comes to embark-
ing on research projects. For this reason, it is not
clear that the concerted projects are fundamental to
generate more R&D activity. Again, to determine
the effect on collaboration with PRCs will require
more detailed analysis, although given the results
Ž .obtained by Link and Rees 1990 and Buesa and
Ž .Molero 1992 , firms with large R&D departments
normally collaborate more often with PRCs. In this
sense, the collaboration established in the concerted
projects is probably not new, but originates from
already established links. In conclusion, if the above
arguments are accepted, the action of the administra-
tion can be considered correct with respect to its
orientation, but there may be a need to prioritise to a
greater extent some categories of firms in relation to
the rest.
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